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Abstract
Volatilities implied from interest rate swaptions are used to assess the size and the
sign of the compensation for volatility risk, for dollar, euro and pound rates at a daily
frequency, between October 1998 and August 2006. The measurement of the volatility
risk premium rests on a simple model according to which variance forecasts are gen-
erated under the objective probability measure. Results show that especially between
September 2001 and mid-2003 dollar implieds were embodying a large - negative -
compensation for volatility risk, a component which was smaller in absolute terms -
but not relative to the level of the respective implied volatilities - for the other two
currencies. While the negative compensation for volatility risk is in line with previ-
ous studies focusing on other asset classes, we also document that it exhibits a term
structure, more evident for dollar and euro rates than for pound rates. The volatility
risk premium is strongly changing through time but much less than implied volatili-
ties. Estimates of risk aversion based on the physical skewness and kurtosis of interest
rate changes suggest that (minus) the volatility risk premium can almost directly be
read as risk aversion, as its proportionality with such risk aversion measure is about
0.8. Also, compensation for volatility risk is positively related to expected volatility,
although the relation is not completely linear. Daily compensation for volatility risk
is in￿ uenced, as expected, by the level of the short term rate and its volatility as well
as by a small but robust number of macroeconomic surprises. The latter induce more
sizeable changes on compensation for volatility risk of dollar rates than of euro or
pound rates.
JEL classi￿cation: G120, G130, G140.
Keywords: Volatility risk premium, risk aversion, economic surprises.ECB





The paper investigates the existence of a gap between implied volatilities extracted 
from options written on swap rates and expectations of such swap rate volatilities. The 
latter are obtained through simulations of a model which filters historical volatilities 
from lagged swap rate changes. The existence of a systematic gap between implied 
volatilities and expectations of realised volatilities would indicate that market 
participants attach a significant price to volatility risk, while allowing at the same time 
their degree of risk aversion to be estimated. Risk aversion can be recovered by 
exploiting its proportionality to compensation for volatility risk. 
The methodology is applied to daily dollar, euro and pound sterling swap rate 
volatilities observed between October 1998 and August 2006. Coherently with 
previous literature, volatility risk is found to be negative and volatility seems to have 
been significantly priced for all three currencies, albeit with a strong time variation, 
with a relative peak between September 2001 and June 2003. An alternative estimator 
of the risk aversion coefficient based on the joint use of the conditional skewness and 
kurtosis of swap rates suggests that volatility risk premium represents a good proxy 
for risk aversion. 
Looking at the determinants of the volatility risk premium (i.e. risk aversion), the 
short-term interest rate, its conditional volatility as well as macroeconomic releases, 
with a small but robust number of US variables playing the key effect on all three 
currencies, seems to be prominent. 6
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1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years a huge literature has evidenced that ￿nancial volatility is stochastic.
Asset pricing models taking into account the presence of stochastic volatility have yielded
good results in applications with Government bonds, equities, foreign currencies and cor-
porate bonds (see Andersen et al., 2002). Allowing for stochastic volatility in the physical
dynamics of the state variables requires that for pricing assets - a task in which the risk
neutral dynamics of the state variables is needed - the functional form of the volatility risk
premium be speci￿ed. However, both the functional form of this premium and its sign are
topics which remain largely unexplored, and represent the focus of this paper.
One can suppose that compensation for volatility risk has a non-zero mean because if,
as said, volatility is stochastic, then rational agents must ask a compensation for its ￿ uc-
tuations.1 Alternatively, one can see implied volatilities (and implied density functions) of
asset prices as close or unbiased indicators of future expected volatilities (and future phys-
ical densities) of that asset price, thus implying that volatility risk is unpriced. However,
the few results presented so far in the literature suggest that it would be wrong to assume
compensation for volatility risk to be zero. Then, if agents ask a rising compensation to
hold volatility-dependent instruments (i.e. options) in presence of rising uncertainty about
future volatility, it is valuable to increase our knowledge about the volatility risk premium
(henceforth vrp) so to correctly assess the practical implications of implied volatilities for
our ￿ physical￿world.
The issue can be illustrated by looking at the surge in dollar swaptions volatilities
between September 2001 and June 2004, a development which was much less evident for
euro rates (Figure 1). As before September 2001 dollar and euro implieds were nearly
equal, the higher swaptions￿implieds on dollar rates must have had a US-speci￿c origin
or must have been induced by increased riskiness in factors to which dollar rates have
higher exposure. Further, dollar volatilities did not increase uniformly along the swaptions
maturity spectrum (the 6-month maturity is reported in the Figure). These developments
led all dollar swap rates to exhibit a strongly negatively sloped term structure of implied
volatilities. Since mid-2003, and more signi￿cantly since mid-2004, the higher average
1However, despite the many econometric analyses dealing with modelling stochastic volatility and the
empirical success of asset pricing models with stochastic volatility, only a few papers (discussed in detail
later in this section) tackle the issue of how the volatility risk premium behaves and what sign and size it
has.ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008 7
volatility of dollar swap rates relative to euro and pound rates and the relative volatility
peak at short horizons have receded. Since end-March 2005 the volatility term structures
have been almost ￿ at with implied volatilities of dollar interest rates close or, at times,
below those observed for euro rates.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
Such developments lead us to investigate what has been observed in the nearly three-
year period after September 2001. That is, were higher dollar implieds re￿ ecting i) ex-
pectations of higher interest rate volatility and stability in the required compensation for
volatility risk, ii) stable expected volatilities but higher compensation for volatility risk or
iii) a combination of the two previous outcomes?
In this paper we use a simulation-based approach which rests on a simple Garch model
to assess if, in nearly eight years of daily data, implied volatilities have been coherent
with model-based expectations of realised volatilities (hence there has been negligible or
small compensation for volatility risk) or if, by contrast, implieds deviated signi￿cantly
from such predictions (therefore implying that volatility risk was signi￿cantly priced).
As explained in detail in the next section, the di⁄erence between implied volatilities and
expected realised volatilities represents, in the discrete time setting of this paper, the
counterpart of the compensation for volatility risk examined in the approach of Bollerslev
et al. (2007). In doing so we take the gap between implied volatilities and model-based
expected realised volatilities as indication that volatility risk has commanded a signi￿cant
compensation, although part of the gap may also re￿ ect potential misspeci￿cation of the
model employed to generate the volatility forecasts. The analysis reported in this paper
refers to at-the-money implied volatilities of dollar, euro and pound swap rates. Among a
large set of swaptions, we examine those regarding the 1, 2, 5 and 10-year swap rates with
option maturity spanning up to 2 years. To anticipate, the main result is that, coherently
with previous evidence focusing mainly on equity indices and currencies, compensation for
volatility risk has been negative and sizeable - especially for dollar rates in absolute terms,
i.e. relative to the level of the corresponding implied volatility - in the period of high
implieds between September 2001 and June 2003. Compensation was lower in absolute
terms for euro and pound swap rates relative to dollar rates, although higher than before
September 2001 also for these two currencies. In relative terms, i.e. scaling vrp by implied8
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volatility, compensation for volatility risk has been higher for euro and pound rates than for
dollar rates. Evidence favouring the presence of a priced volatility risk is also obtained by
looking at the relation between the sign of delta-hedged gains from portfolios of swaptions
and past realised volatility. Looking at time series behavior, vrp changes signi￿cantly
through time but on average moves much less than implied volatility. Hence, changes in
volatility are not fully translated in changes in the compensation for volatility risk. The
interest rate level and its volatility are the main drivers of the compensation for volatility
risk and a small but robust number of macroeconomic surprises - mainly the US nonfarm
payrolls, Chicago PMI and industrial production - lead agents to systematically revise
vrp, beyond in￿ uencing implied volatilities. There is also evidence that news releases in
one country a⁄ect the compensation for volatility risk of other currencies, although the
impact of US macroeconomic surprises on euro and pound rates tends to be more sizeable
than the e⁄ect played by European surprises on dollar rates.
Looking at previous literature, a formal analysis on volatility risk compensation was ini-
tiated by Bakshi and Kapadia (2003). They recovered hints on the presence of a volatility
risk premium looking at delta-hedged gains (henceforth dhg) of options￿portfolios, de￿ned




t r(Cu￿￿uSu)du, where Ct is the option￿ s price
as of time t and ￿t (@Ct=@St) denotes the delta of the option. In a general stochastic












where @Cu=@￿u is the vega of the option and the expectation is taken under the physical
probability measure. It is obvious that if volatility risk is not priced (￿t = 0 in (1)) then
the delta-hedged gain is expected to be nil on average.
By factoring the delta-hedged gain in a part related to the price of the underlying asset
and in a second component which depends on the volatility, the authors showed that the
time series of scaled dhgs Et (￿t;t+￿)=St should vary with volatility, while its cross sections,
obtained by ￿xing ￿ at its day t level, should covary with the option￿ s moneyness (y) and
time to expiry (￿). For Heston￿ s (1993) model they obtained Et (￿t;t+￿) = ￿￿￿t￿St￿ t(￿).
Hence, a relation between Et (￿t;t+￿)=St and any functional form of the volatility would
reveal the existence of a non-zero volatility risk premium.2 It is important to point out
2As for the second test, given that the vega of an option is highest when the option is at the money andECB
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that this analysis helps identify the presence and the sign only, but not the size, of the
volatility risk premium.
Empirically, delta-hedged gains are calculated as:









where t0 = t and tN = t+￿, the delta (￿tn) is the Black-Scholes delta and the volatility
employed in the calculations of the delta comes from a garch estimate of the conditional
volatility of the underlying asset. Bakshi and Kapadia show that for all at-the-money
calls, as well as for each options￿maturity, the delta-hedging strategy loses money, 0.10%
of the index level. The buyer of the call is thus paying a premium to the seller, nearly 43
cents per call, 28 when the option is in the money. Also, gains grow with the maturity
of the options, and at the 31-60-day horizon they are nearly twice as sizeable as for the
14-30-day maturity.
Bakshi and Madan (2006) prove that for the class of pricing kernels m(R) satisfying
the Taylor series expansion around zero,3 the theoretical percentage spread between risk-
neutral (￿2
rn) and physical (￿2






= ￿￿ ￿ (￿2




p(t;￿)) ￿ (kp(t;￿) ￿ 3) (2)
where ￿ is risk aversion and ￿p and kp are the physical skewness and kurtosis. There-
fore, the volatility spread is largest when p(R), the physical marginal density function of
asset returns, is negatively skewed and fat tailed. The conditional skewness and kurtosis
contribute to the spread with weights ￿￿ ￿ ￿p(t;￿) and
￿2
2 (￿2
p(t;￿)) respectively. The au-
thors report that between January 1984 and December 1999 the risk-neutral volatility of
S&P100 index options was 3 percentage points higher than the realised volatility, calcu-
lated as in Andersen et al. (2003), with an average volatility spread of 23.45% and implieds
exceeding realised volatilities in 74% of the months. Subsample analysis evidenced that
positive volatility spread are a post-crash phenomenon, with average spread after October
then tends to decrease, the hypothesis of a non-zero volatility risk premium can be rejected if this relation
is not found between Et (￿t;t+￿)=St and yi;t, with i denoting the moneyness of the option.
3m(R) = 1 ￿ A1 ￿ R + 0:5 ￿ A2 ￿ R
2 + O(R
3) where m(0)=1, A1 =
￿@m
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and some time-t information-based variables Zt, minimising JT = arg min￿g0
T ￿WT ￿gT
where gT(￿) = (1=T)
PT
t=1 "t+1 ￿ Zt and WT a suitable covariance matrix. Empirically,
skewness and kurtosis were calculated on a rolling basis via the S&P100 returns and
updated each 90 days, while the set of instruments Zt employed were the risk-neutral
volatilities dated t, t-1 and t-2. The estimated average risk aversion was reported to be
approximately 17.
Looking at more empirical papers, Carr and Wu (2007) use options on 5 stock indices
and on 35 individual stocks. Interestingly, they get evidence of a signi￿cant volatility
risk premium in options written on the S&P500 index, the S&P100 and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. For individual stocks, however, the presence of vrp is weak and the
magnitudes of risk compensation in such cases are overall smaller than for the three broad
indices. The authors investigate if the negative correlation between stock index and stock
index variance (the leverage e⁄ect) can account for the negative variance risk premia by
regressing the latter on the broad stock index return and a constant. Although the slope
of the regression is negative, the constant has nearly the same magnitude as the average
volatility premium, evidencing that there is no information content in the stock return.
Additional factors, among which those identi￿ed by Fama and French, do not improve the
negative intercept. Hence, they conclude that either there is ine¢ ciency in the market for
index variance or that the market is pricing an independent, unknown, risk factor.
Guo and Neely (2004) transpose the Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) analysis to options on
currency futures. They analyse options on the US dollar against pound sterling, Deutsche
Mark, Japanese yen and Swiss franc between 1975 and 1999. Their delta hedged strategies
are related to realised volatility but negatively related the options￿maturity, unlike the
prediction of Bakshi and Kapadia. Beyond these ￿ndings, they claim that the fundamental
issue is whether the trading pro￿t arising from delta hedged portfolios remains signi￿cant
after adjusting for known risk factors (based on the Capm and on the Fama and French11
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(1993) model). Pooling the delta hedged gains across currencies they are unable to reject
that delta hedged gains are zero. Also Bakshi et al. (2000) and Buraschi and Jackwerth
(2001) show that equity index options are non-redundant securities, suggesting that other
risks, among which variance risks, may be priced. Coval and Shumway (2001) use daily
straddles and argue that the variance risk premium is negative. A rather wide literature
also employs structural models calibrated to options data to recover the volatility risk
premium, among which Guo (1998), Bates (2000), Chernov and Ghysels (2000), Benzoni
(2002), Fornari and Mele (2001) and Pan (2002).
A work that is closely related to the present paper is Bollerslev et al. (2007), where esti-
mates of the volatility risk compensation are presented and put in relation with macroeco-
nomic and ￿nancial determinants. The authors derive the compensation from comparing
model-free implied (IV￿) and realised (V) volatilities.4 Using monthly implied and realised
model-free volatilities for the S&P500 index from January 1990 through May 2004 they
concluded that both measures increased during the latter half of the sample, that realised
volatilities are systematically lower than implieds and that their unconditional distribution
tends to display larger deviations from a normal. On average the risk premium is reported
to have been about -2 percentage points. Looking at determinants of the volatility risk
premium, realised volatility has had the biggest impact, followed by the AAA corporate
bond spread over Treasuries and the P/E ratio.5
2 Forming expectations of swap volatilities
Implied volatilities represent market expectations of future realised volatilities over the
life of the option. However, when volatility is stochastic and volatility risk is priced, they
4To retrieve IV* and V they follow Andersen et al. (2003) in estimating Vt;t+￿ as sums of squared
high-frequency returns over the interval ￿. The model-free measure of risk-neutral integrated volatil-
ity is instead derived from options prices (see Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000; Carr and Wu, 2007;






K2 dK: For expected volatilities it is then easy to
show that E(Vt+￿;t+2￿) = ￿￿E(Vt;t+￿) + ￿￿ and given that IV
￿
t;t+￿ = E
￿(Vt;t+￿) then E(Vt;t+￿) =
A￿IV
￿
t;t+￿+B￿, where A￿ =
(1￿e￿k￿)=k
(1￿e￿k￿￿)=k￿ and B￿ = ￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ e
￿k￿)=k] ￿ A￿￿
￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ e
￿k￿￿)=k
￿]
and the parameters reported in the above formulas come from the physical and risk neutral dynamics of
the price of the asset, i.e.
physical risk neutral
dpt = ￿t(￿)dt +
p





dVt = k ￿ (￿ ￿ Vt)dt + ￿t(￿)dWt dVt = k
￿ ￿ (￿
￿ ￿ Vt)dt + ￿t(￿)dW
￿
t




t ) = ￿
5Similarly to the analysis in Bollerslev et al. (2007), Chernov (2003), Eraker (2004), Jones (2003) and
Pan (2002), analyse volatility risk premia and return risk premia by ￿tting option pricing models.12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
will also include a time varying compensation to stand its ￿ uctuations through time. As
said at the end of the previous section, we use a simple methodology, based on modeling
realised variances as Garch processes, and then forecasting from such models, to mea-
sure the portion of the implied volatility that re￿ ects expected volatility. Namely, we
specify a model for the behaviour of the historical volatility, from which we can draw
volatility forecasts over various horizons, conditionally on being at a given point in time.
The assumption made here is that the historical interest rate volatility is captured by a
parsimonious asymmetric garch(1,1):
rt = ￿ + ￿rt￿1 + ￿tzt
￿2
t = ! + ￿"2
t￿1 + ￿￿2
t￿1 + ￿ max(0;￿"t￿1)2
"t = ￿tztjIt￿1~N(0;￿2
t);zt~NID(0;1)
where (￿;￿;!;￿;￿) are real parameters, rt denotes the logarithmic daily rates of change of
a given swap rate and ￿t is its conditional volatility. Denoting by It￿1 the information set,
i.e. the past history of the interest rate series, forecast errors "t = ￿tzt are conditionally
normal. Alternative distributional assumptions for forecast errors or di⁄erent parame-
trizations of the above equations based, for example, on the huge number of members of
the Arch family, are not explored, mainly because of the way in which zt is sampled in
the simulation exercise. Rather than from a normal distribution, as the "strong garch"
assumption postulates (Drost and Werker, 1995), zt is bootstrapped from the historical
series of forecast errors (i.e. from realised zt) so that any model misspeci￿cation ending
up in non-normal zt will be eventually re-sampled through observed forecast errors.6
To reproduce the time-t expectations of economic agents about future interest rate
volatility, the estimation of the models is performed on expanding samples, the shortest
of which starts on 23 January 1997 and ends on 15 October 1998, hence containing 450
daily observations. In this way, volatility forecasts rely only on information available
6Of course di⁄erent speci￿cations would lead to di⁄erent paths for simulated volatilities as the drift
of the volatility process would di⁄er from what assumed in the asymmetric garch(1,1) employed in the
paper. This would change the relative weight of the ￿ signal term￿￿ ￿ ￿
2
t￿1 with respect to the noise term
￿￿"
2
t￿1.As an example one could employ the asymmetric power Arch of Ding et al. (1993) studied in more
detail in Fornari and Mele (1997) especially as concerns distributional assumptions that lead to a better
￿t of the tail-thickness of ￿nancial data or the component Arch model of Engle and Lee (1999), basically a
reparametrization of a garch(2,2) where the conditional volatility is made up of a long-run (slow changing)
component and a short-run (fast changing) component, which may allow for a more precise identi￿cation
of the expected volatility drift.13
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when forecasts were made. For each day we retain the parameters of the models, based
on an expanding sample starting on 23 January 1997 and ending at time t, the time series
of forecast errors ("t) and the realised ￿ltered volatilities (￿t). In a second step we use
such ingredients to produce, for each calendar day after 15 October 1998, forecasts of
the realised volatility over various horizons. Each day we generate 5000 future paths of
the interest rate and its volatility, for each of the four chosen interest rates (1-, 2-, 5-
and 10-year) and for ￿ve forecast horizons, 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. For each of these
horizons we compute the expected volatility by averaging the simulated daily volatilities
￿rst across the option￿ s maturity and then across the 5000 replications. This average
expected volatility is then compared, for each day in the sample, to the implied volatility
taken from options with the same swap rate as underlying and with the same life to
maturity. To make a practical example, the expected six-month physical volatility is the
average across the 5000 replications of the average volatility simulated in the six months
(126 working days) after a particular day.7 Estimating expected volatility conditioning on
information available only at time t is important because this information may a⁄ect the
volatility of volatility, and changes in this parameter potentially lead economic agents to
adjust the swaptions price relative to what suggested by the historical volatilities.
The structure of the simulation scheme has no major di⁄erences relative to the asym-
metric Garch(1,1) described above. The only di⁄erence, as already mentioned, comes
from the distributional assumption placed on the standardized forecast errors ("t/￿t = zt).
Since the implicit Garch assumption that zt are independently and identically normally
distributed is rejected, especially in high-frequency data, due to the presence of asymme-
try in excess of zero and kurtosis in excess of three, these non-normal features are plugged
back into the simulation to account for the in-sample mispeci￿cation displayed by the
model. For each day in the sample, we randomly select an element from the time series of
zt and then loop over the following two equations up to a two-year horizon (506 days) to
generate a path of ￿2
t+jjt and rt+jjt with j=1,2,..., 506:
7The alternative and computationally much simpler procedure of comparing the current implied volatil-
ity to the current historical volatility (and not to the average expected volatility between t + 1 and t + ￿,
￿ being the maturity of the swaption) forces the compensation for volatiltity risk to depend on the as-
sumption that future volatility is a random walk process, which contrasts with the ￿ndings of the Garch
literature. methodology.14
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￿2
t+jjt = ! + (￿t+j￿1 ￿ zt+j￿1)2 + ￿ ￿ ￿2
t+j￿1 + ￿ ￿ max(0;￿(￿t+j￿1 ￿ zt+j￿1))2
rt+jjt = ￿ + ￿ ￿ rt+j￿1 + ￿t+j ￿ zt+j
We also consider block boostrap-based simulations with a ￿xed block size of 10 working
days, to reproduce more closely the clustering of errors through time, typical of high fre-
quency ￿nancial data. Furthermore, as in each day we have 5000 values for the expected
volatility of each interest rate over the ￿ve forecast horizons, we can recover the simu-
lated marginal density function of expected volatilities. From this we take the 2.5 and
the 97.5 percentiles and use them to build a non-parametric 95% con￿dence interval for
the expected volatility. The con￿dence interval helps to tell days or periods of normal
compensation for volatility risk from days or periods of excessive compensation for volatil-
ity risk, where normal and excessive have to be intended as functions of the con￿dence
interval generated by the process according to which expected volatility is formed.
3 Evidence
3.1 Data and delta-hedged gains
All results in this paper are based on implied volatilities extracted from at-the-money
swaptions8 referred to dollar, euro and pound swap rates. Between January 1997 and
December 1998 Deutsche Mark swaptions were used as a substitute for euro swaptions.
As said, underlying rates are the 1-, 2-, 5- and the 10-year swap rates while the maturity
of the swaptions was selected as 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. All data are taken from
Bloomberg. For all currencies the analysed sample goes from 23 January 1997 to 28
August 2006, but vrp time series are available only after 11 October 1998 (ie 450 days
after the beginning of the sample) as the initial 450 days are needed to generate the ￿rst
forecast volatilities. Figure 2 reports some additional information about the time series
8Swaptions are options on forward swap rates. As a swap rate is made up of a given number of
predetermined ￿xed payments and stochastic ￿ oating payments related to future libor rates, they amount
to options on a portfolio made up of such future libor rates. The number of these libor rates is determined
by the life of the swaption plus the life of the swap rate itself. Swaptions are quoted in terms of implied
volatility, i.e. the volatility value which plugged into the Black (1976) formula, gives thge desired swaption
price. At-the-money swaptions are those for which, at the inception of the contract, the exercise (strike)
price is set equal to the forward interest rate.15
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behavior of implieds, namely those of the 2-, 5- and 10-year swap rates over swaptions
maturities of 6 months and 2 years, which were not evidenced in Figure 1. The two left
panels of the Figure show again that the term structure of dollar implied volatilities was
virtually ￿ at across all interest rates and options￿expirations before September 2001. After
this date, both term structures became negatively sloped, with shorter rates perceived as
more volatile than longer rates, for a given expectation horizon, and shorter expectation
horizons more volatile than longer expectation horizons, for a given interest rate. Since
2005 the two economic areas have had again broadly comparable volatility levels and ￿ at
volatility term structures.
The area between the vertical bars identi￿ed by the symbol ￿ 2￿in Figure 2 evidences
the prolonged phase of US monetary policy easing that took place between 2001 and mid-
2004 while the area between the vertical bars identi￿ed by the symbol ￿ 1￿highlights the US
recession between March and November 2001.9 It is worth noticing that dollar implieds
started to rise a couple of months before the o¢ cial NBER-based start of the recession
and that they kept rising throughout the contractionary phase, peaking at the trough of
the US cycle.
After a few months of pause around these levels, implieds returned to rise, reaching
new historical maxima in late 2002 and in the ￿rst half of 2003. Afterwards they tended
to fall. Euro implieds moved broadly in accordance with dollar implieds, rising across the
US recession, thereafter stabilising and then surging again since mid-2002. However they
reached lower levels than those seen for dollar rates. Looking at spring 2003, the 2-year
dollar rate implied volatility peaked at about 60% annualised while the corresponding euro
implied hardly touched 35% annualised. In addition, euro implieds have been recording a
signi￿cant fall before 2001, while dollar implieds were substantially stable over the same
period.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
Before quantifying the compensation for volatility risk using the garch-based simulation
introduced in the previous section, a preliminary indirect evidence of its presence and
9Although the paper does not aim at measuring how much of the increase in compensation for volatility
risk comes from monetary policy uncertainty, it is straightforward to see that implied volatilities re￿ ected
or have been correlated with market concerns about the modality of US monetary policy reaction to the
￿ de￿ ation scare￿in the United States in 2002-2003 and then to evidence of robust growth in the ￿rst half
of 2004, before the Federal Reserve started to raise o¢ cial interest rates.16
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its sign can be obtained through the model-free method of Bakshi and Kapadia. This
analysis will ￿rst tell us the gains/losses achieved by a delta-hedged strategy. Then it will
be the characteristics of such delta-hedged returns, and their relation with lagged physical
interest rate volatility, to re￿ ect the presence of a priced volatility risk. The discrete time
delta-hedged gains (￿k





















where the ￿rst two terms on the right hand side capture the return to holding the option, k
denotes the maturity of the swap rate Fk (1, 2 and 5 years), Ck
t the price of the swaption,
which before maturity depends on the quoted implied volatility through the Black (1976)
formula, ￿tn(￿
rea;k
t ) is the delta (@C=@Fk) of the swaption with maturity k, which we
assume to be dependent on a measure of time-varying realised volatility of that rate,
proxied by a garch(1,1) as in Bakshi and Kapadia. Last, rn is the observed annualised
3-month rate, N expresses calendar days (ie N=126 for a 6-month horizon) while ￿reb is
equal to one day, i.e. the portfolio is rebalanced each day.
The delta-hedged gains are reported in Figure 3 for the swaptions on the dollar 2-year
rate at the 3- and 12-month horizons, but as evidenced from Table 1 this pattern is typical
of other rates. On average the gains have been negative, with means ranging between
￿2:66(￿10￿5) and ￿1:36(￿10￿3), with the only exception of the swaption with 6-month
life written on the 1-year rate, whose return has been approximately zero. As a ratio of
the spot rates such mean losses on the delta-hedged strategy are not negligible, ranging,
on average for the full sample (minus the last 21, 63, 126 and 253 days for the 1-, 3-, 6-
and the 12-month horizons, respectively) between -1% and -8%, while as a ratio of the
swaption price they ranged from -10% to -40%. Overall, they are not distant from what
obtained by Bakshi and Kapadia for a di⁄erent underlying asset (the S&P500 index) and
across a di⁄erent sample (January 1988 - December 1995). For options with moneyness
ranging between 0 and -5%, they estimated the losses to range between 7% and 34% of
the value of the underlying asset. Looking also at the number of negative occurrences in
the time series of the delta-hedged gains, Bakshi and Kapadia get on average a ￿gure of
68% for options with moneyness between -2.5% and 2.5%. In the case of our interest rate
swaptions, delta-hedged gains for at-the-money instruments are negative in about 65% of17
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times for the 1-year maturity and in about 80% of times for the 6-month maturity. Results
show that the negative return of a delta-hedged strategy has been less the case for euro
rates. In this case means are negative but much smaller than for dollar rates. Losses range
between -1% and -3% of the swap rate level and between -1% and -75% of the swaption
price.
[insert Table 1 about here]
To highlight the presence of a compensation for volatility risk, we now test for a relation
between the delta-hedged gains, scaled by the relevant swap rate, and the lagged interest
rate physical volatility. Given the strong autocorrelation present in the daily time series
of the delta-hedged gains (which overlap for a substantial amount of time) we have re-
sampled them at a monthly frequency and subsequently such re-sampled monthly gains,
scaled by the value of the corresponding underlying asset (i.e. the interest rate on which
the swaptions are written), have been regressed on their ￿rst lag and on the ￿rst lag of
the physical (garch) log-volatility. Predictability (R-squared are in Table 1) is quite large,
about 70% for dollar rates and 60% for euro rates. Although signi￿cant autocorrelation
remains also at the monthly frequency, the ￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient being on
average 0.8 excluding the volatile gains at the 1-month horizon, the sign of the lagged
logarithm of the conditional volatility is negative and signi￿cant in most cases. Figure 4
reports the same time series of delta-hedged gains for the euro denominated swaptions.
For euro rates, although delta-hedged gains are on average negative through the sample,
as mentioned above, regression do not fully support the presence of a negative volatility
risk premium, as lagged garch log-volatility of the euro swap rates does not happen to
be signi￿cantly negative (only 2 cases out of 12). This may provide ￿rst of all indirect
evidence for the hypothesis that in the market for euro interest rate swaptions volatility
risk may have been perceived less strongly than for dollar rates. On the other hand, as the
euro swap market only developed after 1999, agents may have been a⁄ected by the fact
that no historical volatility of euro rates was available, which in turn may have reduced
the weight initially attached to volatility risk. The ￿ndings in Carr and Wu (2007) may
also imply that US rate volatility could have been perceived a priced source of risk for
international portfolios while euro rates volatility did not represent a key risk factor for
their portfolios.18
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[insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]
3.2 Garch-based compensation for volatility risk
Figures 5-7 report (minus) the volatility risk compensation (￿￿t) for dollar, euro and
pound rates, at various horizons, together with the corresponding 1-year swap rates. As
described in Section 2, such series are obtained as di⁄erence between implied volatilities
and Garch-based expectations of realised volatilities. As in Figure 2, the area between the
vertical bars identi￿ed by the ￿ 2￿symbols highlights the long phase of monetary easing in
the US, while the area between ￿ 1￿evidences the 2001 US recession. The 1-year swap rate
has been included to highlight the fact that, despite what one may think, there has not
been a strong direct relation between the interest rate level and the interest rate volatility,
i.e. higher volatilities have not been trivially related to the falling interest rate level, even
in the period of monetary policy easing delimited by the ￿ 2￿symbol.
As said before vrp moves proportionally to risk aversion. In fact, starting from the fact
that ￿t = ￿cov(dmt
mt ;d￿2
t); where mt is the pricing kernel, and assuming that investors have
a power utility function (mt = S
1￿￿
t , with St the asset price) and that a two factor model
governs the dynamics of the interest rate and its stochastic volatility10 then ￿t =
￿t￿￿
￿
where ￿t is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion as of time t, ￿ the correlation between
the two brownian motions characterising the bivariate process governing the dynamics of
the interest rate and its volatility and ￿ is the volatility of volatility parameter. Bollerslev
et al. (2007) obtain
￿
￿ ’ 1 so that in principle one could expect that at least for equity
index options vrp ’ risk aversion. However, as the simulation-based approach employed
in this paper cannot guarantee that minus the vrp stays positive, as one would expect
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to be, vrp will be mainly treated as ￿ volatility risk
compensation￿ , although it will help to recall its proportionality with relative risk aversion
when interpreting its movements across time and its reaction to economic surprises in
Section 4.
All in all, the occurrence of negative values in (minus) vrp is not particularly high
and is indeed much smaller than the number of times the delta-hedged gains are positive,
both for the swaptions analysed in this paper and for the equity index options studied
10Which is the case of the Garch(1,1) model, converging to a continuous time model resembling Heston
(1993). See Bollerslev et al., (2007).19
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in Bakshi and Kapadia. Table 2 shows the percentage of days, out of the full sample,
in which (minus) vrp turned out to be negative. For dollar rates such a percentage was
about 70% for the 1-year swap rate and above 85% for 2-, 5- and 10-year rates. For
euro rates the percentages are even higher and especially so for the 1- and 2-year rates.
Assuming for the time being the proportionality factor between vrp and risk aversion to
be approximately equal to one (more on this in the next subsection), Figure 5 suggests
that at the end of August 2006 risk aversion was very low by historical standards for all
the interest rates analysed. Between 1998 and August 2006 it has been on average 4 across
the three currencies, just one fourth of the gmm-based value of 17 reported in Bollerslev
et al. (2007) based on the S&P500 index over the sample 1990-2004.
[insert Figures 5-7 about here]
Visual inspection of Figures 5-7 suggests that (the negative of the) compensation for
volatility risk is very correlated across rates and maturities. The overall comovement of
vrp across rates and horizons, however, does not imply that vrp is stable across these di-
mensions. Figure 8 shows, for dollar and euro rates only, the unconditional term structures
of vrp, together with the corresponding unconditional term structure of implied volatili-
ties. The curves for the dollar and the euro have a similar shape in most cases - downward
sloping or inverted U-shaped - although overall vrp levels and the slope of the vrp curves
(scaled by the average value of vrp or by implied volatility) tend to be higher for euro
than for dollar rates. Therefore, although - in absolute terms - vrp levels are higher for
dollar rates than for euro or pound rates, in relative terms - i.e. scaling vrp by the relevant
implied volatilities - compensation for volatility risk was on average higher for the latter
rates than for dollar rates.
For all currencies, however, vrp is much lower than the implied volatility of correspond-
ing rates and maturities, on average between one quarter and one third of the latter, with
the di⁄erence being most pronounced between the 1- and the 6-month horizons. As the
vrp term structure is rather ￿ at across maturities compared to implieds￿term structure,
the observed rise in implieds after September 2001 was likely re￿ ecting genuine expecta-
tions of higher volatilities over short horizons (1- and 3-month) but was instead driven by20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
higher compensation required for volatility risk at the 6- and the 12-month horizons.11 12
[insert Table 2 about here]
Despite the high correlation across rates and maturities which one perceives from
Figures 5-7, compensation for volatility risk has evolved quite di⁄erently between dollar
and euro rates (beyond the already mentioned di⁄erences in the levels). Between Summer
1998 and May 2001 (minus) the vrp has been falling for euro rates, while it has been
broadly stable for dollar rates. The decline in relative risk aversion in the euro area in this
period could be seen as the result of the decline in both interest rate level and volatility
in the run up to the single currency and after its inception. It is also interesting to
note that movements in dollar vrp between short and long maturities - for a given rate
- have become more correlated after the September 2001 events, possibly re￿ ecting the
fact that in turbulent periods common factors tend to dominate, therefore curbing the
weigth of idiosyncratic risk factors. However, this was not the case for euro rates, whose
term structure of volatility risk premiums became almost uncorrelated at short and long
horizons, despite the fact that before this date correlations were sizeable and similar to
what observed for dollar rates. After 2004, when interest rates started to rise in main
areas, the movements in vrp across areas have become again less correlated: a decline in
dollar vrp at all horizons has been accompanied by a rise or a stability for euro rates.
[insert Table 3 about here]
Unconditional correlations reveal that comovement was indeed higher within countries
than across countries, possibly re￿ ecting business cycle correlation (vrp proxies for risk
aversion). For dollar swap rates, and across maturities, correlation was on average 0.8,
11The term structure of pound volatilities tends instead to di⁄er from what observed for the other two
currencies. First of all, it is slightly upward sloping for the 1-, 2- and 5-year rates compared to the other
currencies and its steepness is extremely small. In addition the term structure of volatility premiums,
with the exception of the 2-year rate (the horizon which is generally reported to be most in￿ uenced by
news releases) is basically ￿ at across maturities. In other words compensation for volatility risk in pound
swaptions does not appear to be in￿ uenced by the maturity of the contract. This may be related to the
fact that the yield curve of Government bonds yields has also been ￿ atter in the UK than in other major
industrial areas.
12For sake of brevity, the results based on the block bootstrap are not reported in the paper. Overall, vrp
estimates based on block bootstrap did not exhibit noticeable di⁄erences with respect to what reported in
Figures 5 to 7. Of course some di⁄erences tended to emerge in periods of extremely low or extremely high
volatility, when persistence tended to change more than on average, but they were not sizeable enough to
modify either vrp developments or average vrp estimates.21
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more or less the same value as for euro rates, across the whole sample. Across coun-
tries, the dollar-euro correlation exceeded 0.6 for the 1-, 2- and 5-year swap rates at
the 3-month and the 2-year horizons (Table 4) only in one eighth of the cases. While
at the 3-month horizon, and especially for the 1- and the 2-year rates, correlations are
broadly similar and high across countries, at the 2-year horizon they weaken somewhat
in the dollar-euro comparison and fall noticeably in the dollar-pound comparison (Table
5). Comparing horizons, i.e. looking for example at the the 3-month horizon in a coun-
try and to the 24-month horizon in another, correlations drop further. Overall it seems
that the long-end of the volatility risk premium curve for the euro and the pound is not
strongly correlated with both the short and the long end of the term structure of dollar
vrp. All in all, the existence of a term-structure of vrp correlations in the three analysed
currencies is a phenomenon ￿rst higlighted in this paper. While higher correlations across
vrp at short horizons may re￿ ect more correlated business cycle developments at short
frequencies (and/or high spillovers across business cycles), the lower correlation at long
horizons may indicate that country-speci￿c components tend to be more in￿ uential for
business cycle developments, and therefore for risk aversion, at longer horizons. To sum-
marise, compensation for volatility risk is rather correlated, within a given country, across
rates and forecast horizons. By contrast, correlations across countries are strong but tend
to weaken when the forecast horizon in one country di⁄ers from the forecast horizon in
another country.
[insert Tables 4-5 about here]
The estimated volatility risk premium can also be used to shed light on the functional
form of its relation with the implied volatility. To this aim, vrp has been regressed on
a polynomial function of the implied volatility, including the linear, quadratic and cubic
terms plus a logarithm. Regressions have been run for vrp referred to the 1- and 5-year
rates at the 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month horizons and are reported in Figure 9, where shaded
areas represent the observed range of implied volatilities. For euro rates the relation
between vrp and implied volatility is well approximated by a linear function, with vrp
ranging, for the 1-year rate, from about 2% to about 15% when corresponding levels of
the implied volatility range from 12% to 32%. This amounts to saying that, on average, a
30% implied volatility originated from a 18% expected volatility and a 12% compensation22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
for volatility risk. For dollar rates there is a much stronger evidence of nonlinearity,
with vrp, always for the 1-year rate, ranging from approximately 0% to about 20% when
corresponding implied volatility levels ranged from 10% to 55%. This result could provide
a useful insight for continuous time asset pricing, where the speci￿cation of the volatility
risk premium is generally assumed to be a linear function of the volatility, an hypothesis
that seems to be rather weak for dollar rates while, at least in our estimates, ￿nding
support for euro rates.
As expected volatilities are derived as averages across 5000 simulations, con￿dence
interval for the average expected realised volatility can be easily built, allowing the iden-
ti￿cation of extreme movements in the compensation for volatility risk. In this context
￿ extreme movements￿represent those values of the implied volatilities which lie near or
outside the con￿dence interval for the realised volatility referred to the same rate and to
the same horizon. Figure 10 shows the 95% con￿dence interval for the expected volatilities
on dollar and euro rates only, together with the observed implied volatilities taken from
swaptions, for the 2-year rate at selected maturities (6- and 24-month). For the majority
of the dates included in the sample, the implied volatility for both dollar (￿rst row) and
euro rates (last row) ranged within the con￿dence intervals. Put simply, this suggests that
investors were not discounting the occurrence of sizeable jumps in the volatility dynamics
at the selected horizons. The areas between the vertical bars identi￿ed by the ￿ 1￿symbols
in the Figures highlight the period from September 2001 to Spring 2003, when implied
volatilities for both dollar and euro rates, at both maturities, stayed at times outside the
con￿dence interval for the forecast realised volatilities or were persistently very close to
the upper end of the band.
[insert Figure 8 about here]
[insert Figure 9 about here]
3.3 Reality check
As said, the negative of the volatility risk premium moves proportionally to risk aversion
and Bollerslev et al. (2007) found the constant of proportionality to be close to one, at
least with reference to their stock index options dataset. To establish a link between
the negative of the volatility risk premium, as calculated in the present paper, and the
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, we can follow Bakshi and Madan (2006) result that23
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there exists a link between the volatility spread and the skewness (￿p) and kurtosis (kp)
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p(t;￿)) ￿ (kp(t;￿) ￿ 3)
To exploit this link we have calculated a series of 20-day logarithmic changes in 1-, 2-,
5- and 10-year swap rates. From such series, daily time series of volatility, skewness and
kurtosis have been calculated on moving windows of 20 days, between October 1998 and
end-August 2006. For each currency, putting together the volatility spreads (the lhs of the
above equation) for the 4 swap rates and 3 swaptions maturities (6-, 12- and 24-month)
and using as instruments the ￿rst three lags of both the implied volatility and the forecast
expected volatility, in addition to a constant (19 instruments as a whole) results in 228
moment conditions from which the risk aversion coe¢ cient is recovered via the generalised
method of moments. Using only dollar rates, ￿ equalled 3:32, with a t-stat of 74.4. The J-
test was J227 = 216:9; with a extremely high p-value. The relative contribution of skewness
and kurtosis to compensation for volatility risk can be calculated by simply putting to zero
and three, in turn, the time series of the skewness or the kurtosis in equation (2), and
then running again the gmm. When ￿p(t;￿) = 0, the gmm delivers a risk aversion value
of ￿ = 3:60 with a t-stat of over 100 while when kp(t;￿) = 3 we get ￿ = 28:1 with a
t-stat of 31. In both cases the J-test is rather signi￿cant, with p-values of over 50%. As
restrictions are valid in both cases, both the conditional third and fourth moments matter
for the compensation for volatility risk, in line with what found by Bakshi and Kapadia
for the equity market. However, a thing they also found, risk aversion spikes up when the
kurtosis is set to three, implying that such a restriction is too stringent or, equivalently,
that conditional skewness alone is not enough to characterise volatility risk premiums,
while the conditional physical fourth moment could be used almost alone to get a reliable
estimate of the risk aversion coe¢ cient. When euro and dollar rates are used together in
the gmm, the risk aversion estimate does not show signi￿cant changes, reaching a value
of ￿ = 3:73 (using both skewness and kurtosis). Adding pound sterling rates produces
instead a rise to about ￿ = 4:9. In both cases ￿ is signi￿cant and restrictions are accepted.
Running again the gmm for dollar rates but limiting the sample to end-June 2004, a date
after which implied volatilities scaled signi￿cantly back compared to their peaks in 200224
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and 2003, the coe¢ cient of risk aversion rises to ￿ = 8:08, with a t-stat of 153.8, evidencing
that gmm estimation also produces a pattern of time variation in risk aversion similar to
what suggested by the vrp series of Figure 5. Last, we report the average value of the
negative volatility risk premiums across the same dollar rates and the same swaptions
maturities employed in the gmm, which happens to be 4.07. As this value stands slightly
over 20 percent higher than the risk aversion obtained through gmm, i.e. 3.32, we are led
to estimate the constant of proportionality between risk aversion and compensation for
volatility risk to be approximately 0.8 (i.e. a vrp = ￿5 would correspond to ￿ = 4), all in
all not extremely distant from the unit value reported in Bollerslev et al. (2007). Looking
at the sample ending on 30 June 2004, the average value of (minus) the vrp is about 8,
which is almost equal to the risk aversion coe¢ cient calculated via gmm (8.08), further
supporting the conjecture that the proportionality factor is about one.
The risk aversion ￿gures presented so far are dependent on the statistical model chosen
to generate volatility forecasts as well as on the ability of swaptions￿volatilities to be an
accurate representation of markets￿risk neutral expectations. As an additonal check that
the estimated time series of risk aversion behave in accordance with the typical notion of
risk aversion that one has in mind, one can look at their developments in coincidence with
the occurrence of events known to have generated distress in ￿nancial markets. Figure 11
shows the implied volatilities and the vrp for the three currencies, extracted from 6-month
swaptions on the 2-year rate. The vertical bars identify the speci￿c events considered,
namely the Russian debt crisis, the beginning of the burst of the technology bubble, the
US 2001 recession, the events of 9/11/2001, the period of the US jobless recovery and the
de￿ ation scare, the Madrid train bombing, the start of the Fed tightening, the downgrading
of Ford and GM debt, the global equity markets drop between May and July 2006.
The dotted lines - corresponding to the three vrp series - evidence that in accordance
with one￿ s expectations, risk aversion rose in the aftermath of the Russian crisis and in
anticipation of the strong contraction in technology equity prices. After reverting in 2000
it rose again a few months before the beginning of the March 2001 recession, peaking at
the end of the slowdown. The sharpest rise, especially for dollar rates, occurred through
the de￿ ation scare period. Risk aversion was also historically high around the beginning
of the Fed tightening phase between March and June 2004 and is therefore di¢ cult to
disentangle the movements related to news about future monetary policy from those orig-25
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inating, instead, from higher geopolitical risk in the aftermath of the Madrid events of
11 March 2004. However, in contrast with previous events, around the last two episodes
and especially in relation to the turbulences in major equity markets between May and
July 2006, risk aversion did not record signi￿cant changes, although the tensions in the
corporate debt market in May 2005 produced minor spikes, more pronounced in implied
volatilities than in risk aversion. This may provide indication that either the model chosen
to forecast realised volatility does not fully capture movements in expectations or that, as
the last two events were more speci￿c to the equity and corporate debt markets, interest
rate derivatives do not always provide a full picture of developments in global risk aversion.
To shed more light on this issue, exchange rate and stock index options could be employed
to broaden the set of derivatives upon which risk aversion estimates rest.
Looking at each currency in turn, the implied volatility and the associated vrp reported
in Figure 11 exhibit signi￿cant comovement. However, despite what suggested by a simple
visual inspection of the graph, correlations among the two variables have not been always
high. The rolling correlations reported in Figure 12, based on moving windows of 1 year,
evidence periods of signi￿cant disconnect between the quantity of risk and the price of
risk. On average, correlation tends to be extremely high, almost unity, when implied
volatilities are low (see the period before September 2001 and after mid-2006), but in
signi￿cant portions of the sample, when volatility oscillates around medium-to-high values,
periods of high correlation (approximately in the 0.8-0.9 range) are suddenly followed by
periods in which correlation remains extremely low, between 0.1 and 0.5. The period
between September 2001 and June 2002 is an example of disconnect between the two
quantities, with implied volatilities rising and risk aversion remaining broadly stable. From
an asset pricing perspective, the existence of such large changes in correlation between the
two quantities would suggest that it should not be assumed that additional uncertainty
mechanically leads to higher risk premia, as risk aversion, the parameter to which risk
premia are related, may remain relatively stable in presence of rapidly moving expectations
about future risks.
[insert Figures 10 - 12 about here]26
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4 Determinants of the compensation for volatility risk
As seen, between 1998 and 2006 volatility risk compensation has been sizeable across all
three currencies but on average - in absolute terms - higher for dollar rates than for euro
and pound rates. Overall, it was been especially in the volatile September 2001 - June
2004 subsample that vrp (always in absolute terms) was much higher for dollar rates and
exhibited a remarkable time variation. Given these features, an obvious question is what
explains its time variation and its size. According to standard ￿nance theory vrp should
be related to the state variables which determine the payo⁄of the swaption, in the present
application the interest rate level and its volatility. From a more empirical standpoint,
one may nonetheless suppose that other variables, which could be ultimately seen as
conditioning information for these two main factors, are able to a⁄ect market perception
of future volatility risk. Among these, we consider the slope of the term structure, the
slope of the volatility term structure, the corporate spread, macroeconomic variables and
macroeconomic surprises.
4.1 Financial variables
To shed light on the determinants of the compensation for volatility risk at a daily level
we would ideally regress the premium, measured as the di⁄erence between the implied
variance and the forecast realised variance for the four interest rates and the ￿ve maturities
examined so far (the series reported in the Figures 5-7) on the level of the three-month
rate, on a measure of interest rate physical volatility, on the slope of the yield curve and
of the volatility term structure and on some measures of corporate spread. However, as
compensation for volatility risk is borderline stationary, as also the interest rate level and
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mium for interest rate i and maturity k as of time t), rt is the 3-month interest rate, St and
S￿
t are the slope of the yield curve and of the volatility term structure, CRt is the 10-year
swap rate minus the 10-year T-bond rate while CR1
t is the baa rate (or equivalent) minus
the 10-year T-bond rate, ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator and V
(j)
t denotes a vector which
collects the ￿nancial variables employed in levels in the regression. For brevity, results
are only reported for the premium required on US rates (Table 6) but are representative
also of the other two currencies. The vrp is mainly dependent on the expected determi-
nants, i.e. the level of the three-month rate and the level of short-term implied volatility.
Given the estimated coe¢ cients of the two variables in the regressions and their means in
the sample, the compensation derives almost equally from interest rate and interest rate
volatility.
[insert Table 6 about here]
Looking at the coe¢ cients for the variables in levels, reported in the ￿rst seven columns
of Table 6, the short rate level has overall a positive e⁄ect on the compensation for the
1, 2 and 5-year rates but not for the 10-year rate, although the coe¢ cients are signi￿cant
especially for the 1- and the 5-year rate. The risk neutral implied has a negative impact
on compensation and is decreasing across maturities, i.e. its e⁄ect is stronger at short
horizons. On the contrary, physical expected volatility has a positive impact and its e⁄ect
is also more sizeable at short maturities. The coe¢ cient of the physical volatility is on
average twice as big as that of the implied volatility, partly compensating the fact that
the latter volatility measure is generally higher than the former. Overall the net e⁄ect is
positive, i.e. high volatility tends to lead to higher compensation for volatility risk. The
slope behaves pretty much as the interest rate level (a positive slope typically indicates
rising interest rates and therefore increases the compensation for volatility risk). Out of the
two measures of corporate spreads, the swap-T-bond rate di⁄erential is overall negative and
barely signi￿cant; the spread between the baa yield and the 10￿ year T-bond happens to be
positive and highly signi￿cant for most rates and maturities. Looking at ￿rst di⁄erences
most variables have a negative sign, i.e. yesterday￿ s increases in these variables produce
a fall in today￿ s compensation, with the exception of the interest rate level on the 1-year
swap rate and of the physical volatility on the 5-year swap rate. Corporate risk measures
are instead positively related to future changes in volatility risk premiums. Results for the28
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remaining two currencies are in line with what seen for dollar compensation.
4.2 Macroeconomic surprises
Results in the previous subsection show that the compensation for volatility risk in interest
rate derivatives is statistically related to the two variables which a⁄ect the convenience
of buying or selling a swaption, the interest rate level and its volatility. This subsection
focuses instead in detail on the reaction of volatility risk premiums and implied volatilities
to economic surprises.13 Looking at the impact of surprises on vrp is important insofar as
surprises can be seen as unexpected shocks or innovations derived out of a reduced form
model as a traditional Var. Therefore, the reaction of vrp to such shocks is informative
about how market participant adjust their views on future interest rates level and volatility
after unforeseen developments in macroeconomic variables. Ultimately, this analysis sheds
light on the size of the changes in risk aversion induced by economic surprises.
We expect di⁄erences in the way surprises a⁄ect interest rates, realised and implied
volatilities. Previous literature has found that the impact of surprises on interest rates
depends on the sign of the surprise and that positive news for the economy (say, a pos-
itive surprise to the industrial production index) broadly leads to higher yields. Always
according to this literature, realised volatility tends to rise after a shock, quite indepen-
dently of the sign of the latter, while implied volatility tends to fall, again independently
on the sign of the surprises, since uncertainty is resolved after economic annoucements are
made (Ederington and Lee, 1993; Beber and Brandt, 2006). However, resulting from both
the revision to the future path of interest rates and the revision in implied and expected
realised volatilities, compensation for volatility risk is not expected to move in any speci￿c
direction after the release of macroeconomic data, although one may expect good news
for the economy to lower risk aversion and bad news to raise it.
Starting with the reaction of dollar vrp to US economic releases, we ￿nd that a small
number of surprises signi￿cantly a⁄ect vrp over the full sample, although the Nonfarm
payrolls and the Chicago PMI are the strongest. Table 7 reports the regression of changes
in vrp between day t and day t+1 on the Nonfarm payrolls, the Chicago PMI and indus-
13All surprises are de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the actual release of a variable and the corresponding
consensus forecast. Such di⁄erences are then standardised to allow comparison across types of news. For
brevity the list of macroeconomic variables considered is not given in the main text, although Figure 13
displays the variables that in￿ uence dollar and euro vrp.29
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trial production (the full set of signi￿cant variables is reported in Figure 13). Regressions
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated residuals and are run separately
for selected rates and maturities, for the full sample and for three subsamples (October
98 - September 2001; September 2001 - June 2004 and after June 2004). Over the whole
sample, vrp is negatively related to nonfarm payrolls, although such a signi￿cance comes
mainly from the second and especially the third subperiods, both for the 2- and the 5-year
rates, across all maturities. We get a similar pattern for the Chicago PMI although in this
case the link between surprises and changes in vrp seems to be signi￿cant in the second
subsample only for the 2-year rate and in the third one for the 5-year rate. By contrast,
the industrial production surprise had the strongest in￿ uence on vrp before September
2001, while its e⁄ect was lower between September 2001 and June 2004 and nearly negli-
gible in the last subperiod. This ￿nding would suggest that while ￿ hard data￿concerning
industrial production in￿ uenced the perception of risk between 1998 and 2001, labour
market concerns and survey data on activity became more relevant after the recession and
throughout the de￿ ation scare of 2003 and the deceleration in activity in 2006.
[insert Table 7 about here]
Looking at the ￿gures in Table 7, after September 2001 a 2 standard deviation surprise
in nonfarm payrolls reduced vrp on average by about 250 basis points and 160 basis points
at the 3- and 12-month horizons, respectively, for the 2-year rate; for the 5-year rate the
comparable ￿gures are about 90 and 50 points, at the same forecast horizons. For the
Chicago PMI the size of the impact of a 2 standard deviation surprise on volatility risk
premiums was on average only one fourth of that.
In assessing these results it has to be acknowledged that the regressions in Table 7 rest
on a few data points and possibly su⁄er from the presence of noise in economic releases.
A more accurate estimate of the intensity of the relation between economic surprises
and vrp can be obtained by adopting a methodology developed in Rigobon and Sack
(2006). In this framework, ￿nancial variables are allowed to react too much to economic
surprises simply because the latter convey to market participants more information than
what simply related to the release ￿ per se￿ . It is easy to see this by considering that
the nonfarm payrolls bring information on the most recent change in payrolls but also
contains the revisions to previously released payrolls. The overreaction can be isolated30
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by looking simultaneously at how a number of ￿nancial variables move in a given time
interval around the economic release, under the hypothesis that the surprise at hand is
the only information item that may have in￿ uenced the ￿nancial variables in the interval
analysed.
Supposing to have observed NA changes in vrp on day t, when a given news item
was released (in our case we observe 20 contemporaneous changes in vrp, obtained from
4 interest rates and 5 maturities) we calculate the principal components of those NA
changes. Typically the ￿rst component is able to explain far more than 90% of the overall
variability of the 20 individual vrp series. This ￿rst component can be seen as the true
e⁄ect of the surprise on the vrp and, as said before, will represent the e⁄ect of the economic
surprise and other related information that such surprise conveys, released simultaneously
or within a short period of time after the release itself. However, as we are interested in
the e⁄ect played by the economic surprise itself we use a second step to regress ￿ back￿such
￿rst component on the macroeconomic surprise. At this point the ￿ clean￿reaction of the
individual vrp to the economic surprise is recovered by multiplying the slope coe¢ cient in
this regression14 by, in turn, each element of the eigenvector which de￿nes the principal
component. This di⁄erent way of calculating the impact of surprises on vrp will also
allow to evidence if variables whose e⁄ect was negligible in the ols estimation, turn out
to be signi￿cant, and viceversa. Figure 13, top panel, shows for the 2- and the 5-year
dollar rates at the 6-, 12- and 24-month horizon the results of applying this alternative
methodology over the full sample and in the post September 2001 period only. The analysis
con￿rms the existence of a much stronger in￿ uence of surprises in the post-01 sample, with
nonfarm payrolls and Chicago PMI playing the strongest e⁄ect. In the post-2001 period
a 1 standard deviation surprise in the nonfarm payrolls reduces the vrp by about 150
basis points (hence it reduces risk aversion by 120 points) for the 2-year rate and by 125
points for the 5-year rate (hence risk aversion falls by 100 basis points). Signs seem to
be in accordance with expectation, with the noticeable exception of the CPI, as a rise in
consumer price in￿ ation is found to decrease risk aversion, with a much marked e⁄ect on
the post 2001 sample with reference for the 5-year dollar swap rate.
The lower two panels of the Figure shows instead the reaction of dollar vrp to 1 standard
14This coe¢ cint typically happened to be high but lower than unity, indicating the existence of a lower
association between the economic surprises and changes in risk aversion - as captured by the principal
component analysis - than can be gathered from individual regressions based on individual vrp series.31
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deviation surprise in the euro area macroeconomic variables. Only the 12 surprises that
yielded a signi￿cant change (5 from Germany, 5 from Italy, 2 from France) have been
reported in the Figure. Their e⁄ect is overall much more limited than found for the
nonfarm payrolls or the Chicago PMI and on average -20 basis points for the release of the
Italian ppi (on the 2-year rate vrp) and about +25 basis points for the release of news on
the German trade balance (histograms in the Figure are stacked). When judging the e⁄ect
of euro area news on dollar vrp it is more complex to assess the plausibility of the sign,
as the overall impact depends on the movement of the euro and dollar pricing kernels.
Rather than looking at the average reaction of vrp to economic surprises, the top panel
of Figure 14 evidences the time series of the US nonfarm payrolls surprise together with the
corresponding changes in implied volatility and the vrp of the 2-year rate at the 6-month
horizon. The two charts in the upper panel show the changes in implied and vrp that
followed, respectively, the release of positive surprises and of negative surprises. As was
evidenced by the regressions analysis, it is straightforward to see that positive surprises
to nonfarm payrolls reduce risk aversion while the opposite occurs for negative surprises.
However the Figures also con￿rms that the reaction in both implied and vrp to surprises
has been much stronger in 2002-2004 than in other years, with the negative slope of the
regression deriving almost entirely from this period while in the remainder of the sample
surprises appear to induce small positive or negative changes in vrp rather irrespective
of their sign. The bottom panel of Figure 14 shows the absolute values of the changes
reported in the two charts above and evidences more clearly that before 2002 surprises
were overall quite sizeable but the change in implieds and vrp that they induced was very
limited. Between 2002 and 2004, however, susrprises have been smaller than in previous
years but the reaction of market participants has been extremely higher than before, as
highlighted by the huge increase in the black area (which represents the changes in vrp
after the occurrence of surprises) in these three years.
[insert Figures 13 - 14 about here]
Coming to other currencies, the compensation requested on euro rates is a⁄ected by a
small number of european economic surprises. Among these, the UK manufacturing wages
(5-year rate, positive sign, post-2001), German trade balance (5-year rate, positive sign,
post-2001), Italian Ppi (2-year rate, positive sign), Italian Ip index (2-year rate, negative32
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sign), French Cpi (5-year rate, positive sign), euro area IP index (2-year rate, pre-2001, 5-
year rate, post-2001, always negative sign). Overall the e⁄ect is rather limited, always well
below 1 percentage point in absolute value. Some US surprises also a⁄ect compensation
for volatility risk on euro rates. Among these the IP index (2-year rate, post-2001 and
5-year rate, pre-2001, always negative sign), the nonfarm payrolls (2-year and 5-year rate,
post-2001, negative sign), the ism index (all rates, negative sign). The impact of US
variables on euro vrp is similar to the impact of European news on euro vrp, with the
exception of the nonfarm payrolls, whose 1 standard deviation positive release decreases
vrp by about 100 basis points for the 5-year rate, although its e⁄ect is rather limited (20
basis points) for the 2-year rate.
5 Conclusions
Starting from levels similar to those of euro and pound sterling rates, implied volatilities
of dollar rates rose signi￿cantly between September 2001 and June 2004. We have investi-
gated whether rising dollar implied volatilities were re￿ ecting higher expected volatilities
or increased compensation demanded for bearing volatility risk. To this aim we have
compared implied swaptions volatilities to forecasts of realised volatilities, the latter simu-
lated out of a conditional variance model, for various swap rates and swaptions maturities.
Results clearly evidence that volatility risk was perceived to be extremely high for all cur-
rencies between September 2001 and mid-2003, when implied volatilities were persistently
near or above the upper side of the simulated con￿dence interval for the expected realised
volatility. Over such period rates embodied a sizeable - negative - compensation for volatil-
ity risk, signifcantly larger - in absolute terms - for dollar rates than for the remaining
currencies. Since June 2004 this component has gradually receded and at present the com-
pensation for volatility risk appears to be small and smilar in size across currencies. On
average compensation for volatility risk was 5 percentage points across all currencies, a ￿g-
ure which is in line with estimates of risk aversion derived from other types of econometric
estimates.
Compensation for volatility risk is mainly related to the interest rate level as well to its
physical and risk neutral volatility. Other variables, as the slope of the term structure, the
slope of the volatility term structure and indicators of corporate probability of default also33
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a⁄ect the compensation. Among economic announcements, positive surprises for three US
variables (the nonfarm payrolls, the Chicago PMI and industrial production) lead to a
signi￿cant decrease in compensation for volatility risk on dollar rates. They also a⁄ect
compensation on euro and pound rates, but to a much lower extent. Surprises coming
from euro area and UK economic variables also a⁄ect the compensation for volatility risk
demanded on dollar rates.
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Table 1: Regression of (monthly) delta-hedged gains on dollar and euro swaptions on
lagged gains and lagged log-volatility
United States euro
c dhgt￿1 log(￿2
t￿1) R2 c dhgt￿1 log(￿2
t￿1) R2




























































































































































Notes: The Table reports the results of a regression of the delta-hedged gains on
US and euro swaptions on three rates and four maturities on a constant (c) their ￿rst
lag (dhgt￿1) and on the ￿rst lag of the conditional garch log-volatility of the corre-
sponding rate (log(￿2
t￿1)). T-stats are reported in brackets. All standard errors have
been corrected with Newey-West covariance matrix, with 6 lags. Residuals exhibited
no signi￿cant autocorrelation. The regression is run at a monthly frequency between
October 1998 and September 2006. The data on delta-hedged gains, originally avail-
able at a daily frequency, have been re-sampled as of end-month.37
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Table 2: Percentage of days that the vrp is negative, US, euro and pound rates, across
maturities
1-year 2-year 5-year 10-year
dollar rates
1-month 68.2 79.7 79.8 87.9
3-month 64.4 87.9 87.1 90.7
6-month 66.5 88.9 90.1 91.8
12-month 79.6 88.9 91.4 92.4
24-month 80.1 86.1 90.2 92.8
euro rates
1-month 93.2 92.7 87.6 77.0
3-month 94.2 93.9 84.6 77.5
6-month 96.4 93.8 80.5 76.9
12-month 97.3 93.0 72.2 73.5
24-month 97.6 90.9 47.9 60.2
pound rates
1-month 84.3 94.3 91.9 65.2
3-month 85.2 95.8 85.3 71.6
6-month 89.6 92.2 86.6 75.9
12-month 97.2 97.6 89.5 78.6
24-month 97.9 97.9 96.5 92.6
Notes: The Table reports the ratio, as a percentage, between the numer of days
in which the volatility risk premium is negative, and the total number of days in the
analysed sample.38
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviations of vrp; dollar, euro and pound rates
1-year 2-year 5-year 10-year
dollar rates
1-month 4.46 (8.8) 2.36 (5.5) 2.60 (5.2) 4.19 (3.5)
3-month 5.11 (8.3) 6.39 (6.7) 4.37 (4.4) 4.95 (4.0)
6-month 6.78 (9.4) 6.78 (7.0) 5.10 (4.7) 5.12 (4.1)
12-month 6.79 (8.8) 6.24 (6.2) 4.84 (4.3) 4.74 (3.6)
24-month 4.10 (5.2) 4.42 (4.3) 3.76 (3.3) 3.85 (2.8)
euro rates
1-month 6.42 (4.8) 4.62 (3.6) 4.24 (3.3) 1.65 (2.1)
3-month 6.92 (4.8) 5.25 (3.7) 3.66 (2.9) 1.72 (1.9)
6-month 7.72 (4.9) 5.29 (3.4) 2.79 (2.5) 1.54 (1.8)
12-month 7.76 (4.5) 4.62 (2.9) 1.62 (2.0) 1.15 (1.6)
24-month 5.96 (2.9) 2.92 (2.1) 0.09 (1.5) 0.45 (1.5)
pound rates
1-month 4.50 (4.5) 4.52 (3.3) 2.95 (2.5) 1.45 (2.6)
3-month 4.29 (4.1) 5.05 (3.4) 2.99 (2.8) 1.72 (2.5)
6-month 4.73 (3.9) 5.17 (3.8) 3.03 (2.9) 1.74 (2.3)
12-month 5.04 (3.3) 5.60 (3.1) 3.05 (2.6) 1.65 (2.1)
24-month 5.05 (2.8) 5.61 (3.0) 2.92 (2.1) 3.96 (2.2)
Notes: The Table reports the mean and in parentheses the standard deviation of
the compensation for volatility risk for the three currencies, for the four interest rates
and the ￿ve maturities analysed. The statisitics are referred to daily data observed
between October 1998 and August 2006.39
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Table 4: Correlation matrix of dollar and euro compensation for volatility risk
3m1y_eu 3m2y_eu 3m5y_eu 24m1y_eu 24m2y_eu 24m5y_eu
3m1y￿! 0.62 0.53 0.25 0.27 0.07 -0.06
3m2y￿! 0.68 0.67 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.00
3m5y￿! 0.52 0.51 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.20
24m1y￿! 0.63 0.60 0.35 0.56 0.44 0.18
24m2y￿! 0.59 0.61 0.19 0.37 0.45 0.14
24m5y￿! 0.66 0.63 0.27 0.41 0.40 0.19
Notes: The Table reports the coe¢ cients of correlation between volatility risk com-
pensation on a given rate and over a given horizon in one country with corresponding
volatility risk compensation in another country. The ￿rst column identi￿es dollar
compensations while the remaining columns refer to euro (_eu) rates. The statisitics
are referred to daily data observed between October 1998 and August 2006.
Table 5: Correlation matrix of dollar and pound compensation for volatility risk
3m1y_uk 3m2y_uk 3m5y_uk 24m1y_uk 24m2y_uk 24m5y_uk
3m1y￿! 0.57 0.48 0.34 0.16 0.45 0.40
3m2y￿! 0.57 0.31 0.45 0.12 0.27 0.33
3m5y￿! 0.46 0.25 0.04 0.26 0.22 0.11
24m1y￿! 0.58 0.42 0.31 0.44 0.20 0.20
24m2y￿! 0.45 0.23 0.37 0.20 -0.03 0.05
24m5y￿! 0.52 0.39 0.41 0.24 0.16 0.15
Notes: The Table reports the coe¢ cients of correlation between volatility risk
compensation on a given rate and over a given horizon in one country with corre-
sponding volatility risk compensation in another country. The ￿rst column identi￿es
dollar compensations while the remaining columns refer to pound (_uk) rates. The
statisitics are referred to daily data observed between October 1998 and August 2006.40
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Notes: The Table reports the result of a regression of the ￿rst di⁄erence of vrp
on a set of determinants considered both in levels (lagged by one period) and in ￿rst
di⁄erences (lagged by one period). The coe¢ cients ￿5 which were referred to the slope
of the volatility term structure have not been reported, as not signi￿cant, with the
only aim of saving space. T-ratios are reported in parentheses. Regressions are run
from October 1998 to end-August 2006.for daily observations.41
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Table 7: Changes in vrp and implied volatilities around releases of selected news
all sample 10/98 - 9/01 9/01 - 6/04 6/04 - 8/06










































































































































































































Notes: The Table reports the result of regressions of the volatility risk premium
on dollar 2- and 5-year rates, at the 3-month and the 12-month maturity on three
standardised US surprises, across four time intervals, including the full sample. T-
stats are reported in parentheses.42
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Figure 1: Implied volatilities of US and euro 2-year swap rates 













Jan. 97 Jan. 00 Jan. 03 Jan. 06
US, 6m, 2y US, 2y, 2y EU, 6m, 2y EU, 2y, 2y
Source: Bloomberg. 
Notes: The Figure shows daily implied volatilities taken from swaptions 
on the 2-year dollar and euro swap rates with life to maturity of 6 months 
and 2 years. 
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Figure 2: Swaption volatilities of dollar and euro 2-, 5- and 10-year rates at the 
6-month and 2-year horizons 
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Source: Bloomberg. 
Notes: The area between the symbols (2) denotes the period of monetary policy easing 
carried out by the Federal Reserve. The area between the symbols (1) denotes instead the 
US recession. The implied volatilities are taken from swaptions on dollar and euro 2-, 5- 
and 10-year rates with life to maturity of 6 months and 2 years. Data are daily and 
expressed as percentages per year. 
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Figure 3: Delta-hedged gains for dollar-denominated swaptions 
at selected horizons 






3-month horizon: mean = -0.0011, t = -29.1






12-month horizon: mean = -0.00021, t = -3.2
Figure 4: Delta-hedged gains for euro-denominated swaptions at 
selected horizons 






3-month horizon: mean = -0.0011, t = -29.1






12-month horizon: mean = -0.00021, t = -3.2
Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data 
Notes: The two figures show the time series of delta-hedged gains on 
swaptions written on the dollar and euro 2-year swap rate with time to 
maturity of 3 and 12 months. In the calculations of delta-hedged gains, 
swaptions are bought and sold after one day. The delta (derivative of call 
price with respect to underlying price) used in the construction of the 
gains is based on Black 1976 model, but the volatility comes from a 
garch(1,1) estimate. 45
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Figure 5: Volatility risk compensation, dollar 2-, 5- and 10-year swap rates (6-month 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The Figure shows (minus) the compensation for volatility risk (vrp) calculated as the 
difference between implied swaptions volatility and the corresponding simulated expected realised 
volatility. As an example, vrp,6m,2y indicates the compensation required to sell a swaption on the 
2-year swap rate, 6 months forward. The 1-year spot rate is also reported. The area between the 
symbols (2) denotes the period of monetary policy easing carried out by the Federal Reserve. The 
area between the symbols (1) denotes instead the US recession. 46
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Figure 6: Volatility risk compensation, euro 2-, 5- and 10-year swap rates (6-month 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The Figure shows (minus) the compensation for volatility risk (vrp) calculated as the 
difference between implied swaptions volatility and the corresponding simulated expected realised 
volatility. As an example, vrp,6m,2y indicates the compensation required to sell a swaption on the 
2-year swap rate, 6 months forward. The 1-year spot rate is also reported. The area between the 
symbols (2) denotes the period of monetary policy easing carried out by the Federal Reserve. The 
area between the symbols (1) denotes instead the US recession. 47
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Figure 7: Volatility risk compensation, pound 2-, 5- and 10-year swap rates (6-month 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The Figure shows (minus) the compensation for volatility risk (vrp) calculated as the 
difference between implied swaptions volatility and the corresponding simulated expected realised 
volatility. As an example, vrp,6m,2y indicates the compensation required to sell a swaption on the 
2-year swap rate, 6 months forward. The 1-year spot rate is also reported. The area between the 
symbols (2) denotes the period of monetary policy easing carried out by the Federal Reserve. The 
area between the symbols (1) denotes instead the US recession. 48
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Figure 8: Term structure of the volatility risk premia and the implied 
volatilities of dollar and euro interest rates 
dollar rates: 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The two panels of the figure report – for dollar and euro rates – at selected horizons, the 
term structure of the implied volatilities on the 1-, 2-, 5- and 10-year swap rates along with the term 
structure of the corresponding volatility risk premium. Data are expressed as percentages per 
annum and are averages between October 1998 and August 2006. 
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Figure 9: Estimated functional form linking implied volatilities to 

























































Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The upper panel refers to dollar rates., the lower panel to euro rates. The shaded areas 
represent the historical range in which implied volatilities have oscillated. The curves are 
obtained by regressing volatility risk compensations on a polynomial in implied volatilities 
where current and lagged values are considered. The polynomial includes a linear, quadratic, 
cubic and logarithmic term. 50
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Figure 10: Implied swaptions volatilities and confidence interval for expected 
volatilities (dollar and euro rates, selected rates and forecast horizons) 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The figure reports, for dollar and euro rates only, the implied volatilities from swaptions on 
the 2- and the 5-year rate with maturity of 6 months, along with the simulated realised volatility 
and its confidence interval. Simulated volatility and confidence intervals are based on 5000 
replications of a asymmetric garch(1,1) fitted to logarithmic rates of change of swap rates. Daily 
figures in percentages, annualised. The area delimited by the (1) symbols identifies the period 
between September 2001 and June 2003, when implied volatilities were often outside or close to 
the upper side of the confidence bands. 
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Figure 11: Implied swaptions volatility and vrp around selected events 
(swaptions and vrp on the 2-year rate at the 6-month maturity; in 
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Source: calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The upper panel reports implied volatilities, the lower panel the 
compensation for volatility risk (vrp). The numbered vertical bars identify the 
following events: 2 = Nasdaq starts to fall; 3 = US recession; 4 = 9/11; 5 = 
jobless recovery / deflation scare; 6 = Madrid train bombing / start of Fed 
tightening; 7 = Ford and GM debt downgraded to junk status; 8 = Global stock 
markets drop. 52
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Figure 12: Rolling correlations between implied swaptions volatilities 












Jun. 99 Jun. 00 Jun. 01 Jun. 02 Jun. 03 Jun. 04 Jun. 05 Jun. 06





Source: calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The figure reports 1-year rolling correlations between implied volatilities 
and compensations for volatility risk on the 2-year swap rate, at the 6-month 
horizon, for dollar, euro and pound (the series reported in the upper panel of 
Figure 11). Daily figures in percentages, annualised. The number vertical bars 
identify the following events: 2 = Nasdaq starts to fall; 3 = US recession; 4 = 
9/11; 5 = jobless recovery / deflation scare; 6 = Madrid train bombing / start of 
Fed tightening; 7 = Ford and GM debt downgraded to junk status; 8 = Global 
stock markets drop. 
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Figure 13: Principal component-based reaction of dollar volatility risk 
compensation to US news (top panel) and euro area news (bottom panels), in 
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Source: Calculations based on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The figure reports the reaction of dollar volatility risk premium to various types of 
news, calculated through principal components. In the labels, DE stands for Germany, FR 
for France, IT for Italy. Fac. Ord. is factory orders, PM is purchasing managers’ index, 
Ret. Sal. is retail sales, Tra. Bal. is trade balance, Cons. Exp. is consumer expenditures, 
CPI is consumer price index,. Cons. Conf. is consumer confidence, Ind. Prod. Is industrial 
production, PPI is producer price index. 
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Figure 14: Reaction of implied volatilities and compensation for volatility 
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Source: Calculations on Bloomberg data. 
Notes: The upper two panels of the figure reports the change in the implied volatility and the 
volatility risk compensation on the 2-year dollar swap rate at the 6-month horizon on days 
characterised by the release of the nonfarm payrolls. Such releases have been standardised and named 
surprised. The first of the two panels reports the changes in the two variables following positive 
surprises while the second reports their change after negative surprises. The bottom panel shows the 
absolute values of the figures reported in the two panels at the top of the figure. Histograms in the 
bottom panel are stacked, therefore the scale of the y-axis in this panel does not correspond to the 
scale reported in the two top panels. Values for changes in implied volatilities and vrp are expressed 
in percentages annualised, news are standardised values. 55
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
817   “Convergence and anchoring of yield curves in the euro area” by M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, R. S. Gürkaynak 
and E. T. Swanson, October 2007.
818   “Is time ripe for price level path stability?” by V. Gaspar, F. Smets and D. Vestin, October 2007.
819   “Proximity and linkages among coalition participants: a new voting power measure applied to the International 
Monetary Fund” by J. Reynaud, C. Thimann and L. Gatarek, October 2007.
820   “What do we really know about ﬁ  scal sustainability in the EU? A panel data diagnostic” by A. Afonso 
and C. Rault, October 2007.
821   “Social value of public information: testing the limits to transparency” by M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, 
October 2007.
822   “Exchange rate pass-through to trade prices: the role of non-linearities and asymmetries” by M. Bussière, 
October 2007.
823   “Modelling Ireland’s exchange rates: from EMS to EMU” by D. Bond and M. J. Harrison and E. J. O’Brien, 
October 2007.
824   “Evolving U.S. monetary policy and the decline of inﬂ  ation predictability” by L. Benati and P. Surico, 
October 2007.
825   “What can probability forecasts tell us about inﬂ  ation risks?” by J. A. García and A. Manzanares, 
October 2007.
826   “Risk sharing, ﬁ  nance and institutions in international portfolios” by M. Fratzscher and J. Imbs, October 2007.
827   “How is real convergence driving nominal convergence in the new EU Member States?” 
by S. M. Lein-Rupprecht, M. A. León-Ledesma, and C. Nerlich, November 2007.
828  “Potential output growth in several industrialised countries: a comparison” by C. Cahn and A. Saint-Guilhem, 
November 2007.
829   “Modelling inﬂ  ation in China: a regional perspective” by A. Mehrotra, T. Peltonen and A. Santos Rivera, 
November 2007.
830   “The term structure of euro area break-even inﬂ  ation rates: the impact of seasonality” by J. Ejsing, J. A. García 
and T. Werner, November 2007.
831   “Hierarchical Markov normal mixture models with applications to ﬁ  nancial asset returns” by J. Geweke 
and G. Amisano, November 2007.
832   “The yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics” by P. Hördahl, O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2007.
833   “Explaining and forecasting euro area exports: which competitiveness indicator performs best?” 
by M. Ca’ Zorzi and B. Schnatz, November 2007.
834   “International frictions and optimal monetary policy cooperation: analytical solutions” by M. Darracq Pariès, 
November 2007.56
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
835   “US shocks and global exchange rate conﬁ  gurations” by M. Fratzscher, November 2007.
836   “Reporting biases and survey results: evidence from European professional forecasters” by J. A. García 
and A. Manzanares, December 2007.
837   “Monetary policy and core inﬂ  ation” by M. Lenza, December 2007.
838   “Securitisation and the bank lending channel” by Y. Altunbas, L. Gambacorta and D. Marqués, December 2007.
839   “Are there oil currencies? The real exchange rate of oil exporting countries” by M. M. Habib and M. Manolova 
Kalamova, December 2007.
840   “Downward wage rigidity for different workers and ﬁ  rms: an evaluation for Belgium using the IWFP 
procedure” by P. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, December 2007.
841   “Should we take inside money seriously?” by L. Stracca, December 2007.
842   “Saving behaviour and global imbalances: the role of emerging market economies” by G. Ferrucci 
and C. Miralles, December 2007.
843   “Fiscal forecasting: lessons from the literature and challenges” by T. Leal, J. J. Pérez, M. Tujula and J.-P. Vidal, 
December 2007.
844   “Business cycle synchronization and insurance mechanisms in the EU” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, 
December 2007.
845   “Run-prone banking and asset markets” by M. Hoerova, December 2007.
846   “Information combination and forecast (st)ability. Evidence from vintages of time-series data” by C. Altavilla 
and M. Ciccarelli, December 2007.
847   “Deeper, wider and more competitive? Monetary integration, Eastern enlargement and competitiveness in the 
European Union” by G. Ottaviano, D. Taglioni and F. di Mauro, December 2007.
848   “Economic growth and budgetary components: a panel assessment for the EU” by A. Afonso 
and J. González Alegre, January 2008.
849   “Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, January 2008.
850   “Statistical tests and estimators of the rank of a matrix and their applications in econometric modelling” 
by G. Camba-Méndez and G. Kapetanios, January 2008.
851   “Investigating inﬂ  ation persistence across monetary regimes” by L. Benati, January 2008.
852   “Determinants of economic growth: will data tell?” by A. Ciccone and M. Jarocinski, January 2008.
853   “The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies revisited” by M. Hagedorn and I. Manovskii, 
January 2008.
854   “How do ﬁ  rms adjust their wage bill in Belgium? A decomposition along the intensive and extensive margins” 
by C. Fuss, January 2008.
855   “Assessing the factors behind oil price changes” by S. Dées, A. Gasteuil, R. K. Kaufmann and M. Mann, 
January 2008.57
ECB
Working Paper Series No 859
January 2008
856   “Markups in the euro area and the US over the period 1981-2004: a comparison of 50 sectors” 
by R. Christopoulou and P. Vermeulen, January 2008.
857   “Housing and equity wealth effects of Italian households” by C. Grant and T. Peltonen, January 2008.
858   “International transmission and monetary policy cooperation” by G. Coenen, G. Lombardo, F. Smets 
and R. Straub, January 2008.
859   “Assessing the compensation for volatility risk implicit in interest rate derivatives” by F. Fornari, January 2008.Date:
15
Jan,
2008
15:40:22;Form
at:
(210.00
x
297.00
mm);Output
Profile:
SPOT
IC300;
Preflight:
Failed!